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With the Doha round in trouble, the so-called “spaghetti bowl” of multilateral trade rules 
and proliferating regional trade deals is, once again, prominently on the radar screen of 
the international trade community.  Perfect examples of this image are the longstanding 
US-Canada softwood lumber and US-Mexico sweetener disputes.  Both trade spats, 
extensively litigated in NAFTA and the WTO, are close to reaching a climax.  Fueling 
the suspense is that the WTO and NAFTA may reach different results. 
 
1. The spaghetti bowl of WTO and NAFTA proceedings 
 
On 15 November 2005, a WTO panel accepted a US finding that Canadian imports of 
softwood lumber threaten to cause material injury to US competitors.2  Earlier this year, 
however, on 10 August 2005, a NAFTA Extraordinary Challenge Committee confirmed 
an earlier (Chapter 19) NAFTA panel conclusion that the evidence on record does not 
support a finding of threat of material injury.3  With NAFTA finding in favor of Canada 
(that is, no threat of material injury, hence no US right to either antidumping or 
counterveiling duties), and the WTO finding in favor of the United States, what is next?  
Can the United States maintain its extra duties on Canadian lumber (currently averaging 
20.15 %) or must the duties be withdrawn and/or repaid?  If the latter, must the United 
                                                 
1 Duke University School of Law and Member of the Editorial Board.  The cut-off date for this contribution 
is 6 December 2005.  This contribution draws on my earlier ASIL Insight, The U.S.-Canada Softwood 
Lumber Dispute Reaches a Climax, 30 November 2005, available at 
http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/11/insights051129.html.  
2 Panel Report on United States – Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber 
from Canada, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada, WT/DS277/RW, circulated on 15 
November 2005. 
3 Opinion and Order of the Extraordinary Challenge Committee, In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber 
Products from Canada, Secretariat File No. ECC-2004-1904-01USA, 10 August 2005 (hereafter ECC 
Opinion). 
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States refund the full, or only part of, the amount of what so far adds up to over US $4.2 
billion? 
 
Additional proceedings are pending, not on injury, but on whether Canada is dumping or 
subsidizing lumber in the first place.  The US determination of subsidy has been 
condemned five times by a NAFTA Chapter 19 panel4 and three times by the WTO, most 
recently in an Appellate Body report of 5 December 2005.5  Implementing the latest 
NAFTA ruling on subsidization, the United States, on 22 November 2005, reduced its 
determination of subsidy from an original 19 % to a 0.8 % de minimis level.6  The US 
determination of dumping, in turn, has been the subject of three negative NAFTA 
Chapter 19 rulings7 and one negative WTO Appellate Body report.8  US re-
determinations, which continue to find dumping (in some cases at higher levels than 
beforehand), are currently under review in both fora. 
 
Similarly, for more than 5 years now, the United States has blocked the selection of 
panelists on a NAFTA (Chapter 20) panel to examine the legality of US quotas on 
Mexican cane sugar under a sugar-specific NAFTA annex.9  In contrast, when Mexico 
imposed anti-dumping duties against US imports of high-fructose corn syrup (an 
                                                 
4 Most recently:  Decision of the Panel on the Fourth Remand Determination, In the Matter of Certain 
Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Final Affirmative Counterveiling Duty Determination, File USA-
CDA-2002-1904-03, 5 October 2005. 
5 Appellate Body report on United States — Final Countervailing Duty Determination With Respect To 
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, 
WT/DS257/AB/RW, circulated on 5 December 2005.  Besides the original Appellate Body report in this 
dispute finding against the United States, another WTO panel has also condemned the US preliminary 
determination of subsidy (Panel Report on United States - Preliminary Determinations With Respect To 
Certain Softwood Lumber From Canada,WT/DS236/R, adopted on 1 November 2002).  Note that under 
NAFTA Chapter 19, only final (not preliminary) antidumping and counterveiling determinations can be 
challenged (NAFTA Article 1904).  This may partly explain why Canada decided to bring this case (also) 
to the WTO, as this was the only available forum at the time the United States made its preliminary 
determination. 
6 U.S. Finally Determines Canadian Softwood Not Subsidized: One Step Toward Resolution, International 
Trade Canada, Press Release No. 230, 22 November 2005, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca.  
7 Most recently:  Decision of the Panel following Remand, In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber 
Products from Canada, Final Affirmative Antidumping Determination, File USA-CDA-2002-1904-02, 9 
June 2005. 
8 Appellate Body Report on United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from 
Canada, WT/DS264/AB/R, adopted on 31 August 2004. 
9 NAFTA Annex 704.2, Appendix B entitled Trade in Sugar.  See Rodolfo Cruz Miramontes, The NAFTA 
and The So-called Parallel Letters, Mexican Law Review (2005:3) available at 
http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/rev/mlawr/cont/3/arc/arc3.htm. 
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alternative sweetener predominantly produced in the United States), a WTO panel swiftly 
condemned the Mexican duties.10  More importantly, when Mexico responded, in 2002, 
with an extra 20 % tax on soft drinks using sweeteners other than cane sugar, the United 
States promptly obtained a WTO panel.  Notwithstanding Mexican arguments that the 
broader sweetener dispute -- that is, both the US quotas and the Mexican tax in response -
- ought to be decided under NAFTA or that, in the alternative, the WTO should accept 
the tax as a valid countermeasure to induce US compliance with NAFTA, on 7 October 
2005, a WTO panel found the tax to be discriminatory in violation of GATT.11  With the 
United States allegedly violating NAFTA (through sugar quotas and/or blocking the 
establishment of a panel roster12) and, in response, Mexico violating the WTO, what is 
next?  Must Mexico withdraw the discriminatory tax or can it rely on NAFTA (or general 
international law on countermeasures) to keep it in place? 
 
Finally, as if the picture was not yet complex enough, three Canadian lumber companies 
(Canfor, Tembec and Terminal) have, in their capacities as investors in the United States, 
invoked the investor-state dispute mechanism of NAFTA Chapter 11.  They claim, inter 
alia, that US treatment of Canadian lumber imports is discriminatory and constitutes 
“indirect expropriation”.  Together, they seek a total of US $540 million in compensation 
from the US government.  Avoiding further risk of inconsistent rulings (this time within 
Chapter 11 of NAFTA), on 7 September 2005, a NAFTA panel consolidated these three 
requests in one single proceeding.13  Similarly, three US sweetener companies (Corn 
Products International, Archer Daniels and Tate & Lyle) initiated proceedings against 
                                                 
10 Panel Report on Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the 
United States, WT/DS132/R, adopted on 24 February 2000 (not appealed).  A subsequent Mexican re-
determination, confirming anti-dumping duties, was also declared inconsistent by a WTO Panel and then 
the Appellate Body in 2001 (Appellate Body Report on Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-
Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United 
States, WT/DS132/AB/RW, adopted on 21 November 2001). 
11 Panel Report on Mexico – Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/R, circulated on 7 
October 2005. 
12 Article 2009.1 of NAFTA unambiguously states:  “The Parties shall establish and maintain a roster of up 
to 30 individuals who are willing and able to serve as panelists” (italics added). If such roster had been 
established, Mexico could have relied on NAFTA Article 2009.2(d) in the face of a US refusal to appoint 
panelists, providing that, in such case, “panelists shall be selected by lot from among the roster members 
who are citizens of the other disputing Party”.   
13 Order of the Consolidation Tribunal, In the Matter of:  NAFTA and a Request for Consolidation by the 
USA of the Claims in Canfor Corporation v. USA and Tembec et al. v. USA and Terminal Forest Products 
Ltd. V. USA, 7 September 2005, available at www.naftaclaims.com. 
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Mexico under NAFTA Chapter 11.  They claim, inter alia, that the Mexican tax is 
discriminatory and constitutes “indirect expropriation”.  Together, they seek a total of US 
$425 million in compensation from the Mexican government.  Unlike the lumber cases, 
however, on 20 May 2005, a NAFTA tribunal refused to consolidate these requests.14  As 
a result, two parallel proceedings, by two completely different Chapter 11 tribunals, are 
now examining the same Mexican tax.   
 
What if these NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals come out differently, or find one thing and 
the WTO (or, for that matter, tribunals operating under other NAFTA Chapters), another?  
Indeed, of the 40 notices of arbitration filed under NAFTA Chapter 11, a majority relates 
to standard trade policies that could have been brought before the WTO (or NAFTA trade 
chapters).15  The complex interaction between investment and trade dispute settlement 
proceedings is only in its infant stage.  In environment-related disputes, the situation may 
be even more complex, through intersections with NAFTA’s side agreement on the 
environment.  This side agreement enables anyone living in any of the three NAFTA 
countries to petition a factual investigation into whether a NAFTA party is effectively 
enforcing its own environmental law.16  At least one investor found it useful to seek such 
investigation in the context of its NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute.17  
                                                 
14 Order of the Consolidation Tribunal, In the Matter of:  NAFTA and a Request for Consolidation by 
Mexico of the Claims in Corn Products International, Inc. v. Mexico and Archer Daniels Midland 
Company and Tate and Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. Mexico, Case CIADI Nr. Arb(AF)/04/5, 20 May 
2005, available at www.naftaclaims.com. 
15 See www.naftaclaims.com (I count the 107 notices of intent filed by members of the Canadian Cattlemen 
for Fair Trade against the US ban on cattle from Canada as one).  For example, of the 14 NAFTA Chapter 
11 cases brought between January 1994 and November 2005 against the United States, at least 9 related to 
cross-border trade in goods. 
16 Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC).  Such 
investigation does not lead to an award, only a factual record.  More recent free trade agreements (FTAs) 
concluded by the United States include full-fledged state-to-state arbitration proceedings to force parties to 
implement their own labor and environmental laws, subject to monetary damages (see, for example, 
Singapore-US FTA, Articles 17, 18 and 20.7).  This could theoretically lead to the following odd result:  
one arbitration panel may condemn a party for failure to enforce its environmental or labor law, whilst 
another investment tribunal under the same FTA might find that this very same law violates the investment 
provisions of the FTA.  Interestingly, these recent FTAs include a conflict clause stating that “[i]n the event 
of any inconsistency between this Chapter [on investment] and another Chapter [on, for example, labor or 
environment], the other Chapter shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency” (see, for example, US-
Singapore FTA, Article 15.3.1).    
17 Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Determination pursuant to Article 14(3) 
of the NAAEC, Submitters: Methanex Corporation & NESTE Canada Inc., SEM-99-001 and SEM-00-002, 
30 June 2000 (refusing to initiate an investigation).  Methanex claimed that California failed to enforce its 
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 2. Untangling the strings 
 
The short term answer to the questions raised above is that both the October WTO panel 
on sweeteners and the November WTO panel on softwood lumber will be appealed to the 
WTO Appellate Body.  The result of such appeals can then be expected somewhere 
around March or April of 2006. 
 
The long term answer is more complicated.  Although clearly dealing with the same 
broader dispute on lumber or sweeteners, the different rulings out of NAFTA and/or the 
WTO are not, strictly speaking, in a relation of res judicata.  Traditionally, for the 
principle of res judicata to apply and, therefore, for two rulings to be genuinely in 
conflict, the overlapping proceedings must involve (1) the same parties, (2) the same 
subject matter, and (3) the same legal claims.   
 
Most obviously, as concerns the first requirement (“same parties”), the NAFTA Chapter 
11 cases are between private investors and the US/Mexican government.  In contrast, the 
WTO and NAFTA Chapter 19 and 20 cases are between governments.  Under NAFTA 
Chapter 11, private investors have standing.    At the WTO and under NAFTA trade 
chapters, however, standing is reserved to state parties (not private traders).18   
 
Considering the second requirement (“same subject matter”), the NAFTA lumber panel 
rejecting a US finding of threat of material injury was made with reference to a US 
determination of May 2002.19  In contrast, the WTO lumber panel accepting a US finding 
of threat of material injury relates to a December 2004 re-determination concerning the 
                                                                                                                                                 
environmental laws by allowing gasoline to be released into the environment from leaking underground 
storage tanks.  If confirmed, such factual record could have assisted Methanex with its claim of 
discrimination under NAFTA Chapter 11 regarding a Californian ban on MTBE, a gasoline additive. 
18 Under NAFTA Chapter 19, although it is always a government that will initiate a panel, private parties 
can force the government to do so.  See NAFTA Article 1904.5. 
19 On 18 May 2004, the NAFTA Chapter 19 panel rejected a US request to reopen the record.  See ECC 
Opinion, supra note 3, at para. 8. 
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same period of investigation but made on the basis of a different (i.e., reopened) record.20    
Equally, the specific subject matter of the blocked NAFTA panel on sweeteners is:  US 
quotas on Mexican cane sugar.  In contrast, the subject matter of the WTO sweeteners 
panel is:  a Mexican tax on sweeteners other than cane sugar.   
 
Finally, the different proceedings do not exactly involve the same legal claims (third 
requirement for res judicata).  WTO panels examine claims of violation of WTO rules.  
NAFTA Chapter 11 and 20 panels (such as the blocked sweetener panel) examine claims 
of violation of NAFTA.  Crucially, whilst the WTO lumber panel accepting a US finding 
of threat of material injury did so pursuant to WTO rules, the NAFTA Chapter 19 panel 
rejecting a US finding of threat of material injury did so pursuant to the United States 
own trade laws.  Indeed, the applicable law under NAFTA Chapter 19 is not NAFTA but 
the domestic law of the defending country. 
 
Nonetheless, the absence of res judicata should not lead one tribunal to completely 
ignore the work of the other.   
 
Firstly, WTO panels must carefully examine whether NAFTA proceedings do not 
preclude the WTO’s jurisdiction (and vice versa).  As far as normal trade panels under 
NAFTA Chapter 20 are concerned, for example, (to be distinguished from NAFTA 
Chapter 19, dealing exclusively with dumping and subsidies) NAFTA Article 2005 
explicitly provides that “disputes” regarding a “matter” arising under both NAFTA and 
the WTO can be brought to either forum.  However, once “procedures have been 
initiated” at either forum (there does not seem to be a need for an actual panel), the forum 
selected shall be used (either by the complainant or the defendant, it would seem) “to the 
exclusion of the other”.  In the WTO sweetener panel, however, neither Mexico nor the 
panel referred to NAFTA Article 2005.  Similarly, in the lumber dispute (brought before 
                                                 
20 The WTO panel accepting threat of injury was a so-called compliance panel.  In 2004, the panel found 
that the original US determination of May 2002 was inconsistent with WTO rules (WT/DS277/R, adopted 
on 26 April 2004).  Under WTO rules the United States was then allowed to make a new (so-called Section 
129) determination where additional information was gathered and new hearings held (unlike in the 
NAFTA proceedings where the panel denied a US request to reopen the record, see supra note 19).  This 
led to the December 2004 re-determination, accepted by the 2005 WTO compliance panel. 
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both NAFTA Chapters 19 and 11), NAFTA explicitly regulates the interaction between 
NAFTA Chapter 11 investment disputes and NAFTA Chapter 19 antidumping and 
subsidy disputes.  NAFTA Article 1901 states that nothing in Chapter 11 “shall be 
construed as imposing obligations” with respect to US “antidumping law or 
counterveiling duty law”.  This clause will be a difficult hurdle to overcome for the 
Canadian lumber companies in their (consolidated) Chapter 11 tribunal.21   
 
Secondly, even if different proceedings can advance in parallel (or sequentially) without 
res judicata triggered and with no other hurdles elsewhere in either treaty, a WTO panel 
still ought to take cognizance of a NAFTA panel’s analysis (and vice versa), as well as 
factor in the risk of inconsistent rulings.  Double recovery should also be avoided.  
Showing no sense of such “judicial comity”, the November WTO lumber panel, however, 
does not make a single reference to the concurrent NAFTA Chapter 19 proceedings.  
Similarly, in the sweetener dispute both the WTO and NAFTA are faced with claims of 
violation of national treatment (albeit under different legal provisions).  Hence, one 
would expect, for example, that when the NAFTA Chapter 11 panel examines NAFTA 
Article 1102 on national treatment it would at least take cognizance of an earlier WTO 
analysis, of the very same tax measure, under the GATT’s national treatment provision.22   
 
3. What is next? 
 
Where does this leave the Mexican sugar industry and Canadian lumber producers, both 
original complainants in these disputes?   
                                                 
21 The interaction between NAFTA proceedings and factual investigations under NAFTA’s side agreement 
on the environment (NAAEC) is also explicitly dealt with.  Article 14.3(a) of the NAAEC provides that if 
“the matter is the subject of a pending judicial or administrative proceeding”, the Secretariat shall proceed 
no further.  On that basis, a request by Methanex under the NAAEC was denied because of Methanex’s 
pending request under NAFTA Chapter 11.  See supra note 17. 
22 This does not mean that a violation of national treatment under GATT necessarily implies a violation of 
national treatment under NAFTA Chapter 11.  For obvious reasons, Mexico was, indeed, adamant that the 
WTO panel make “clear that its findings apply solely to the parties’ respective rights and obligations under 
the WTO agreements and cannot be taken to prejudge legal rights under other rules of international law” 
(Panel Report, supra note 11, at para. 205).  For a rejection of WTO national treatment concepts in NAFTA 
Chapter 11 proceedings, see Methanex Corporation v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on 
Jurisdiction and Merits, 9 August 2005, available at www.naftaclaims.com, Part IV – Chapter B (at para. 
37:  “the text and the drafters’ intentions, which it manifests, show that trade provisions were not to be 
transported to investment provisions”). 
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 If confirmed by the WTO Appellate Body, Mexico will probably be forced -- under the 
threat of US trade sanctions -- to end the 20 % tax (albeit only prospectively).  In 
addition, if the NAFTA Chapter 11 panels find against it, Mexico may have to pay close 
to 500 million US$ in retrospective damages to US sweetener producers.  WTO remedies 
are, indeed, purely prospective, centered on bringing inconsistent measures in compliance 
with WTO rules.  In contrast, remedies under NAFTA Chapter 11 focus on the past and, 
apart from monetary compensation, cannot force a government to change its future 
conduct.23  None of this litigation, however, is likely to provide greater US market access 
for Mexican sugar.  To resolve this dispute, the United States ought to agree to a roster of 
Chapter 20 panelists (a roster which, pursuant to NAFTA Article 2009, should have been 
established more than 10 years ago).  If so, the Chapter 20 panel which Mexico is asking 
for since 2000 could be appointed by lot and proceed to examine the NAFTA conformity 
of US quotas on Mexican sugar.24  Ironically, what has expanded market access for 
Mexican sugar is not litigation, but the devastation caused by hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
to sugar producers and refiners in Louisiana and Florida.  Causing a shortage in domestic 
sugar, these natural disasters forced the United States to dramatically increase import 
quotas.25
 
As far as lumber is concerned, even if the WTO Appellate Body confirms that the 
December 2004 US re-determination complies with WTO law, the fact remains that the 
United States (pursuant to NAFTA Chapter 19) violated its very own laws, at least as 
between May 2002 (date of imposition of the duties) and December 2004 (date of the re-
determination), a period during which around US $3 billion were collected.26  In this 
                                                 
23 NAFTA Article 1134 provides that “the Tribunal may award only: (a) monetary damages … or (b) 
restitution of the property”.  Yet, in the latter case, “the award shall provide that the disputing Party may 
pay monetary damages … in lieu of restitution”. 
24 See supra note 12. 
25 See USDA Announces Increase in FY 2006 Sugar Availability, USDA News Release No. 0525.05, 
December 2, 2005, available at www.usda.gov (increasing allowable sugar imports for fiscal year 2006 
with 450,000 tons).    
26 On September 10, 2004, the US International Trade Commission did, indeed, determine that no threat of 
material injury existed as directed by the NAFTA Chapter 19 panel (see ECC Opinion, supra note 3, at 
para. 11).  Yet, as pointed out earlier (see supra note 20), to comply with a 2004 WTO panel, the ITC 
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context, it is instructive that Article 103 of NAFTA includes a general conflict clause in 
favor of NAFTA in the event NAFTA provisions are inconsistent with GATT or other 
agreements to which all NAFTA members are party.     
 
Canada is now suing the United States before the US Court of International Trade to have 
the duties removed and the deposits returned.  In response, the US Coalition for Fair 
Lumber Imports has challenged the constitutionality of NAFTA Chapter 19 before the 
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  If the United States refuses to comply 
with NAFTA Chapter 19 -- that is, its own laws as interpreted by a NAFTA panel -- 
Canada can request the establishment of a Special Committee under NAFTA Article 
1905.  If the Special Committee finds against the United States, Canada has the right to 
suspend any NAFTA benefits v-a-v the United States “as appropriate under the 
circumstances”.   
 
Relief for Canadian lumber producers under NAFTA Chapter 19 may, therefore, not be 
immediate, but (like the investment complaints under Chapter 11) it could operate 
retroactively (at least from 2002 to 2004).  As NAFTA Chapter 19 enforces domestic 
(US) law, the remedies it provides have retrospective potential.  In contrast, as pointed 
out earlier, a WTO victory can only work prospectively and has never included a refund 
of past duties collected.   
 
Another difference in the remedies structure relates to the period and way to implement 
adverse rulings.  In NAFTA Chapter 19 there is, obviously, no appeal.  The panel 
remands the case “for action not inconsistent with the panel’s decision” and establishes 
“as brief a time as is reasonable for compliance with the remand”.27  For the three 
negative panel decisions in the lumber (injury) case, for example, this implementation 
period was, respectively, 100, 21 and 10 days.28  Crucially, in quite a daring move, the 
third of these panel reports did not content itself with a simple remand.  In addition, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
subsequently reopened the record and, in December 2004, made a new, positive determination that there 
was threat of material injury. 
27 NAFTA Article 1904.8. 
28 See ECC Opinion, supra note 3, paras. 6-11. 
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panel specifically precluded the US International Trade Commission (ITC) “from 
undertaking yet another analysis of the substantive issues” and instructed that the ITC 
determine “that the evidence on the record does not support a finding of threat of material 
injury”.29  This made an end to a series of US re-determinations in September 2004.  As 
one concurring panelist put it:  “Due process is not endless process … for the Panel to 
postpone finality by issuing yet another open-ended remand instruction to the 
Commission would be to allow the Chapter 19 process to become a mockery and an 
exercise in futility”.30  
 
The implementation of WTO panels, in contrast, takes considerably longer:  WTO panels 
can be appealed and only recommend that the Member concerned “bring the measure into 
conformity”.31  The “reasonable period of time” to do so is not set by the panel itself, but 
agreed on by the parties or determined in a separate arbitration.32  The guideline in such 
arbitration is that this period should not exceed 15 months from the date of adoption of 
the report.  In the WTO lumber (injury) case, for example, the United States and Canada 
fixed the implementation period at 10 months33 (a far cry from the 100, 21 and 10 days 
under NAFTA Chapter 19).  Crucially, the carousal of potentially endless re-
determinations has so far not been stopped in any WTO proceeding.  In contrast to 
NAFTA, no WTO panel has specifically ordered a WTO Member to make a negative 
finding on injury, dumping or subsidy.  To make WTO dispute settlement more efficient, 
thought should be given to shortening the procedures and implementation periods in 
antidumping and counterveiling duty cases, along the lines of the expedited procedures 
                                                 
29 Second Remand Decision of the Panel, In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from 
Canada:  Final Affirmative Threat of Injury Determination, Secretariat File No. USA-CDA-2002-1904-07, 
31 August 2004, at 4 and 7 (upheld by the ECC Opinion, supra note 3).  In terms that cannot be mistaken, 
the Panel explained its ruling as follows (at 3):  “The Commission has made it abundantly clear to this 
Panel that it is simply unwilling to accept this Panel’s review authority under Chapter 19 of the NAFTA 
and has consistently ignored the authority of this Panel in an effort to preserve its finding of threat of 
material injury.  This conduct obviates the impartiality of the agency decision-making process, and severely 
undermines the entire Chapter 19 panel review process”. 
30 Ibid., at 8 and 12. 
31 DSU Article 19.1. 
32 DSU Article 21.3, but note the exception for prohibited subsidies in Article 4.7 of the Subsidies 
Agreement (where the panel must recommend withdrawal of the subsidy and fix the time-period to do so, 
normally a mere 90 days). 
33 WTO Document WT/DS277/7. 
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for prohibited subsidies in the Subsidies Agreement.34  WTO panels could also make use 
of their mandate in Article 19.2 of the DSU to “suggest ways in which the Member 
concerned could implement the [panel’s] recommendations”35, suggestions that could, in 
extreme cases, eventually match the NAFTA Chapter 19 panel’s specific instruction not 
to find threat of injury.36  Thus tightening the WTO process may not be appropriate for 
all WTO disputes.  Yet given the purely prospective nature of WTO remedies, where 
WTO Members can effectively impose any extra duties for free during at least 2 years, 
the field of antidumping and counterveiling duties are prime candidates for such reform. 
 
More immediately, in its second administrative review (deciding on actual assessments 
for 2003-2004), released on 6 December 2005, the United States lowered the combined 
duties on Canadian lumber from 20.15 % to 10.81 %.37  The latter figure will soon be 
imposed also for new cash deposit rates for future shipments thus providing at least some 
relief for Canadian lumber producers. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The WTO-NAFTA spaghetti bowl is very real.  To untangle it requires a complex and 
open-minded analysis.  Tools to facilitate such analysis are available in international law 
(such as res judicata) and specific treaty provisions (such as NAFTA Article 2005).  
Success will depend above all on a healthy degree of judicial tolerance and curiosity.  For 
private stakeholders the complexity is less attractive.  In lumber and sweeteners, for 
example, one guesses that by now only the law firms involved are enjoying the feast. 
Treaty negotiators should keep this in mind and explicitly regulate potentially 
                                                 
34 See supra note 32. 
35 In Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, for example, the 
Panel found that since “the entire investigation rested on an insufficient basis, and therefore should never 
have been conducted … we suggest that Guatemala revoke the existing anti-dumping measure on imports 
of Mexican cement, because, in our view, this is the only appropriate means of implementing our 
recommendation” (WT/DS60/R, adopted on 25 November 1998, at para. 8.6, a panel finding that 
subsequently became moot as the Appellate Body decided that the matter fell outside the Panel’s terms of 
reference).  
36 Keep in mind that, as much as Article 19 of the DSU, NAFTA Article 1904.8 does not include an explicit 
mandate for a NAFTA Chapter 19 panel to instruct a negative determination.   
37 US Department of Commerce to Lower Softwood Lumber Duties, International Trade Canada, Press 
Release No. 243, December 6, 2005, available at www.softwoodlumber.gc.ca. 
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overlapping jurisdictions.  Remedy structures should equally avoid endless litigation.    
Yet, at some stage, litigation reaches its limits.  With the existing rulings in hand, and in 
the shadow of never ending litigation, time may have come, in both the lumber and the 
sweetener dispute, for comprehensive political settlements.  
 12
